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引用本文:安玉莲,孙世民,夏兆敏.畜产品供应链质量控制策略的微分博弈分析[J].中国农业资源与区划,2019,40(9):48~56
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畜产品供应链质量控制策略的微分博弈分析
安玉莲1,2,孙世民1※,夏兆敏2
1.山东农业大学经济管理学院,泰安271018; 2.山东财经大学工商管理学院,济南250014
摘要:
[目的]畜产品质量关系消费者的健康和安全,故畜产品质量控制关系国计民生,对此进行研究意义重大。[方法]运用微分博弈方法研究了畜产品供应链质量控制策略问题。考察比较了Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg主从博弈和协同合作博弈3种模式下畜产品供应链中养殖场户和屠宰加工企业双方的最优质量控制策略。[结果](1)若畜产品供应链总收益分配系数σ∈(0, 2/ 3),则养殖场户与屠宰加工企业间的Stackelberg主从博弈严格优于双方间的Nash非合作博弈; (2)养殖场户与屠宰加工企业间的协同合作博弈是一种集体理性模式,协同合作博弈模式下,养殖场户和屠宰加工企业的质量控制水平与畜产品供应链的最优值函数均大于分散博弈模式下的质量控制水平与最优值函数;(3)导出了能够使养殖场户和屠宰加工企业开展质量协同控制的畜产品供应链总收益分配系数的合理取值范围。[结论]最后,通过数值模拟,验证了所建模型与研究结论的正确性。
关键词:  畜产品供应链质量控制策略微分博弈模拟仿真协同机制
DOI:
分类号:F3263
基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目“基于供应链的畜产品质量控制机制策略研究”(15BGL136)
DIFFERENTIAL GAME ANALYSIS OF QUALITY CONTROL STRATEGY IN LIVESTOCK PRODUCT SUPPLY CHAIN
An Yulian1,2, Sun Shimin1※, Xia Zhaomin2
1. College of Economics and Management, Shandong Agriculture University, Tai′an, Shandong 271018, China;2. College of Management, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan, Shandong 250014, China
Abstract:
Since the quality of livestock products is closely related to the health and safety of the consumers, it is of great significance to strictly control the quality of livestock products. So does the related research. Using the Differential Game theory, this article made a research on the quality control strategies of the livestock product supply chain: when and how the supply chain partners, as a whole and as individuals, can get the maximal benefits, meanwhile the desired quality control level also could be achieved. First, mathematics models about the objective functions of the livestock farm and the slaughtering enterprise were established, and the optimal functions satisfied the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation. And then it respectively deduced the best quality control strategies of the livestock farm and the slaughtering enterprise in the case of Non cooperative Game, Stackelberg Game and Cooperative Game. Comparing of the quality control levels of the 3 cases, the results were showed as follows. Firstly, in the case of Cooperative Game, the quality control levels of the livestock farm and the slaughtering enterprise were higher than that of Non cooperative Game and Stackelberg Game, and so were the maximal values of the income function of the two tier supply chain; Secondly, and when the ratio of income allocation was between and , the Stackelberg Game was a much better choice than non cooperative Game for both of the players. And it also drew a conclusion that there was a range of ratios of income allocation that could bring about a win win cooperation of the two partners,and the rang of the ratios were calculated. At last, an extra step is taken to verify the correctness of the models and the conclusion by the numerical simulation.
Key words:  supply chain of livestock product  quality control strategy  differential game  simulation test  cooperative mechanism
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