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引用本文:张琰飞,陆薇.基于演化博弈的企业参与乡村旅游扶贫机制研究[J].中国农业资源与区划,2019,40(12):250~258
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基于演化博弈的企业参与乡村旅游扶贫机制研究
张琰飞, 陆薇
吉首大学商学院,湖南吉首416000
摘要:
[目的]企业参与对于提升乡村旅游扶贫绩效具有重要作用。从企业参与的角度分析乡村旅游扶贫问题,发挥企业在乡村旅游扶贫中的作用,具有重要的研究价值和现实意义。[方法]由于外部性问题,政府行为对乡村旅游扶贫最终绩效具有显著影响,客观上要求政府给予相应支持和规范,以更好发挥企业的扶贫作用。以政府监管与企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的关系分析为基础,构建政府监管与企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的演化博弈模型; 从政府监管角度,模拟企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的演化博弈过程,分析影响博弈双方策略选择的相关因素,探索政府和企业的演化稳定策略。[结果](1)政府监管行为对企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的策略选择具有显著影响,企业实质扶贫的策略选择取决于政府严格监管的强度。(2) 要保障企业长期进行实质性扶贫策略,政府的支持措施要有力度,并保持严格监管的强大压力,对虚假扶贫的处罚要到位,解决企业在扶贫中的盈亏问题。(3)政府要建立完善的扶贫过程评估机制和事后审计机制,有效降低监管成本,提高管理效率; 政府应发挥市场监管作用,保护良好的市场环境。[结论](1)获取足够多的收益是推动企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的基本条件,而政府足够强的监管则是保障企业长期进行实质扶贫的关键。(2)针对企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的难点,政府要强化对企业参与实质扶贫的激励机制,加大对虚假扶贫惩处力度,培育企业参与的意识与能力,优化企业介入环境,以提升企业参与乡村旅游扶贫的效率。
关键词:  演化博弈企业参与政府监管乡村旅游扶贫机制
DOI:
分类号:F5906
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目“武陵山片区企业参与乡村旅游精准扶贫的绩效提升机制研究”(71663018); 湖南省自然科学基金项目“乡村旅游系统多元利益主体协同治理机制研究”(2019JJ50480); 湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会课题成果“乡村旅游扶贫开发中的反公地悲剧及其治理机制研究”(XSP19YBZ107); 湖南西部经济研究基地开放基金项目(19JDZB018); 湖南省自然与文化遗产研究基地项目(19JDZB041)
STUDY ON POVERTY ALLEVIATION MECHANISM OF ENTERPRISES PARTICIPATION IN RURAL TOURISM BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME
Zhang Yanfei, Lu Wei
School of Business, Jishou University, Jishou, Hunan 416000, China
Abstract:
Enterprises participation plays a vital role in promoting poverty alleviation performance in rural tourism. Therefore, there is important research value and practical significance to analyze the problem of poverty alleviation in rural tourism from the perspective of enterprises participation and to play the role of enterprises in the poverty alleviation of rural tourism. Due to the externality of poverty alleviation, the government behavior had a significant impact on the ultimate performance of rural tourism poverty alleviation, and so it objectively required government to provide corresponding supports and regulations to better play the role of enterprises in poverty alleviation. Thus, based on relation between government regulation and enterprises participation in rural tourism for poverty alleviation, we constructed an evolutionary game model with government and enterprises as the two players in poverty alleviation through rural tourism. Then, from the perspective of government supervision, we simulated the evolutionary game process of the enterprise participating in rural tourism poverty alleviation, analyzed the factors of the game strategy options affecting the two sides, and explored the evolutionarily stable strategy of government and enterprises. The results showed that the implementation of government policies had a significant impact on enterprises′ poverty reduction behaviors, and the enterprises′ behavior depended on the effective implementation efforts of the government policy. In order to protect enterprises′ long term strategy of poverty alleviation, the government′s support measures should be strengthened, the pressure of stringent regulations should be maintained, and the punishment for the dishonesty poverty alleviation should be in place, so as to solve the profit loss of enterprises in the poverty alleviation. Also, the government should establish a perfect mechanism for the assessment of poverty alleviation process and the post audit mechanism to effectively reduce the regulatory cost and improve the management efficiency. Finally, the government should also play the role of market supervision to protect the pleasant business environment. To pursue more profit is the necessary condition for enterprises to participate in poverty alleviation through rural tourism, and intense government supervision is the key to ensure the long term substantial poverty alleviation. To the difficulties on enterprises participation in rural tourism for poverty alleviation, it needs to reinforce the incentive mechanism of poverty reduction in real terms, and increase the punishment efforts for dishonesty poverty alleviation, and cultivate the consciousness and capacity of enterprises participation, and optimize the participation environments, so as to improve the poverty alleviation efficiency through enterprises participation in rural tourism.
Key words:  evolutionary game  enterprises participation  government supervision  rural tourism  poverty alleviation mechanism
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